Organizing to Win: Strategic Impact of Violent Rebel Groups in the Southern Philippines
August 5, 2011 (Friday), 2:00 to 4:00 p.m., TWSC Conference Room, Lower Ground Floor, Palma Hall, University of the Philippines-Diliman
Main Discussant:
Dr. Nori Katagiri
Visiting Research Fellow
Third World Studies Center (TWSC)
and
Assistant Professor
Department of International Security Studies
United States Air War College
Dr. Nori Katagiri
Visiting Research Fellow
Third World Studies Center (TWSC)
and
Assistant Professor
Department of International Security Studies
United States Air War College
Abstract
How does the organizational design of insurgent groups affect their military effectiveness? Answering this question is difficult as violent rebel groups are quite diverse across nations in the Third World and it requires us to examine a number of such organizations. However, it also provides a set of important implications for governments contemplating how to fight them effectively and helps them formulate counterinsurgency strategies. Through the survey of the literature of insurgent organizations and military effectiveness, I argue that, while insurgency is a result of a number of internal and external factors, there are several organizational patterns in these groups and that differences in these patterns explain the variation in the level of strategic effectiveness. I seek to illustrate these arguments using a case study of two major active rebel groups in the southern Philippines—the Abu Sayyaf Group and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front.
How does the organizational design of insurgent groups affect their military effectiveness? Answering this question is difficult as violent rebel groups are quite diverse across nations in the Third World and it requires us to examine a number of such organizations. However, it also provides a set of important implications for governments contemplating how to fight them effectively and helps them formulate counterinsurgency strategies. Through the survey of the literature of insurgent organizations and military effectiveness, I argue that, while insurgency is a result of a number of internal and external factors, there are several organizational patterns in these groups and that differences in these patterns explain the variation in the level of strategic effectiveness. I seek to illustrate these arguments using a case study of two major active rebel groups in the southern Philippines—the Abu Sayyaf Group and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front.
We invite all with an interest in insurgent groups in the Philippines - particularly those in Muslim Mindanao - to participate in or observe the discussion.
Organized by the UP Third World Studies Center
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